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PROPERTY, CREDIT, AND REGULATION
MEET INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT IN
THE SECURITIES MARKETS
CHARLES W.

MOONEY, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

The structure and operation of today's financial markets largely reflect
relatively recent advances in electronic information technology and its
applications. The ability of market participants to communicate and store vast
amounts of information at very high speeds has irreversibly transformed the
landscape of these markets. The age of the global, twenty-four-hour-day
market is at hand.' Significantly, these developments seem to be unending;
change continues at an accelerating pace. This article reflects on the
implications of these developments for those who deal with commercial law,
in particular the laws relating to the transfer and pledge of investment
2
securities within the structure of modern securities markets.
The principal goal of this article is to identify and illuminate the attributes
of electronic information technology applications in the context of
commercial law. By explicitly drawing attention to the relevant attributes of
technology, this taxonomy may assist those who are called upon to create
(legislatively, judicially, and administratively), administer, and interpret
commercial law.
Consideration of securities market clearing and settlement provides a
particularly useful and timely context within which to examine technology and
commercial law. Clearance and settlement comprise the process whereby
securities market participants consummate their agreements to buy and sell
securities (trades). The buyer pays the seller, and the seller "delivers"
(transfers a property interest in) the securities. The securities markets are
highly automated, relying heavily on information technology, and systems for
Copyright © 1992 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I wish to thank Professor Lynn M. LoPucki of the University of Wisconsin Law School for his
comments on an earlier draft of this article and for many valuable discussions before and during its
preparation.
1. See, for example, Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA"), Trading Around the Clock:
Global Securities Markets and Information Technology (Govt Printing Office, 1990) (background
paper, OTA-BP-CIT-66).
2. By "commercial law" I mean laws relating to the contract and property rights aspects of
securities transactions as contrasted with laws and administrative regulations dealing with the
regulation and supervision of securities markets and financial institutions that participate in those
markets. As will be shown, however, both regimes must be considered together.
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clearing and settlement are now being examined closely with a view toward
continuing reforms. 3 In addition, the principal commercial law dealing with
securities transfer, article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), 4 is
now being revised. A committee of the American Bar Association's Section of
Business Law has issued a preliminary report that calls for revision of article
8, 5 and the drafting committee of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws is now at work. 6 Finally, in 1990 Congress enacted
legislation that gives the Securities and Exchange Commission the power to
issue preemptive federal regulations dealing with the transfer and pledge of
7
securities.
In addition to its taxonomic agenda, this article illustrates the challenges
that confront legal "scientists," legal "engineers," and legal "technicians"
operating within the penumbra of electronic information technology. These
challenges bear much in common with the obstacles confronting anyone
working on any law reform project or social problem. Nonetheless, the
taxonomy of the attributes of electronic information technology applications
reveals some special, even unique, considerations for the legal specialists.

3. See Report: Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World's Securities Markets (Group of
Thirty, 1989) (making nine proposals for reforming the world's securities markets) ("G-30 Report").
The Group of Thirty is a "private sector group concerned with the working of the International
Financial System." Id at i. See also Improving International Settlement (Federation Internationale
Des Bourses de Valeurs, 1989) (report concerning clearance and settlement in the world's securities
markets); Study of International Clearing and Settlement (Office of Technology Assessment, 1989)
(same); Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO on Clearing and Settlement (International
Organization of Securities Commissions, 1990) (same).
4. The American Law Institute, Uniform Commercial Code: 1990 Official Text With Comments art 8
(Investment Securities) (West, 12th ed 1990) ("UCC").
5. See American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, Interim Report of the Advisory
Committee on Settlement of Market Transactions (Exposure Draft, Feb 15, 1991) ("ABA Interim
Report"). For other recent critiques of article 8, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A
New Modelfor Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermedianes, 12 Cardozo L Rev 305
(1990); Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 12 Cardozo L Rev 557 (1990).
6. A draft revision of article 8, dated May 1, 1992 ("1992 Draft Article 8") received its "first
reading" in August 1992, at the Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. It is likely that the revision will be promulgated officially in 1993.
7. Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-432 (1990), amending § 17A(a)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78q-1. On March 14, 1986, the Department of Treasury
proposed new federal regulations governing the transfer and pledge of U.S. treasury securities,
called the Treasury/Reserve Automated Debt Entry System ("TRADES"). 51 Fed Reg 8846 (1986),
to be codified at 31 CFR pt 357. A substantially revised version of proposed TRADES regulations
was published on November 28, 1986. 51 Fed Reg 43027 (1986), to be codified at 31 CFR pt 357.
Another substantially revised version was proposed recently. 57 Fed Reg 12244 (1992), to be
codified at 31 CFR pt 357 (proposed April 9, 1992), amended by 57 Fed Reg 20572 (1992). Final
regulations have not been issued.
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I
ATrRIBUTES OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION COMMUNICATION AND

STORAGE TECHNOLOGY

How does electronic information technology differ from traditional media?
Professor Katsh has noted four basic, if very general, differences: 8
(1) Amount of information that can be stored ("Storage Capacity"). There
are virtually no limits to the amount of information that can be
stored on computers. The seemingly constant development of more
advanced computer chips continues to make it possible to store more
information in less space.
(2) Speed of transmission of information ("Transmission Speed").
Electronic
communications
are
virtually
instantaneous.
Enhancements in media, such as optic fiber cables, allow an
increasing volume of information to be transmitted simultaneously.
(3) Ease of accurate reproduction of modification of and access to information
("Ease of Access"). Computer technology also makes it possible to
reproduce, modify, search for, and discover information with great
ease and accuracy.
(4) Speed of revision, modification, and discovery of information ("Speed of
Access"). Similarly, computer technology allows very rapid
reproduction, modification, and discovery of information.
There are other characteristics of electronic information communication
and storage, some of which derive from the four just mentioned, that are
particularly significant in the context of creating, administering, and
interpreting law. 9 For example:
(5) Reduced costs of communication ("Reduced Cost"). Advances in the
application of electronic communication have drastically reduced the
costs of information communication and storage. One expert has
estimated that these costs have been reduced by ninety-five percent
during the last twenty-five years.' 0
(6) Complexity of operational systems and relationships ("System
Complexity").

The

operational

systems

that

apply

electronic

information communication and storage technology and the
resulting relationships are enormously complex. Thus, these
systems are often opaque, or even invisible, to the uninitiated. Many
of the lawyers and judges that interact with these systems probably
remain (more or less) uninitiated. The discussion below of securities
market clearing and settlement will further illuminate the
8. M. Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law 21 (Oxford U Press, 1989).
9. I make no claim that the taxonomy proposed here is exhaustive.
10. Paul F. Glaser, The Intersection of Technology and Financial Services, in Daniel R. Siegel, ed,
Innovation and Technology in the Markets 13, 16 (Probus, 1990). Presumably that estimate refers to a perunit cost. Because more information is being communicated and stored today, it is possible that the
aggregate expenditures for communication have increased.
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characteristic complexity of these systems and the relationships that
they create.
(7) Complexity of the electronic technology that supports the complex
operational systems ("Technology Complexity"). Just as the operational
systems are complex, so are the sophisticated computer hardware
and software that drive these systems.
(8) Facilitation of both centralized and decentralized systems
("Centralization/Decentralization").
The
Storage
Capacity,
Transmission Capacity, Ease of Access, and Revision Speed
characteristics allow systems to decentralize by making remote access
feasible. On the other hand, the volume of information and number
of participants involved in a system do not prevent complete or
partial centralization of that system.
(9) The creation and packaging of new kinds of property, products, and
relationships("New Property"). Electronic information communications
and storage have made possible the creation of new kinds of
property, products, and relationships. Examples are innovations in
securities market trading" and the products that are traded and
used. 12
(10) Frequency of advances/changes in technology and in the operational
systems through which technology is applied ("Frequent Change"). Advances
and changes in available technology and in the systems that actually
employ it continue to occur at a seemingly exponential pace. Much
of what is here today will almost certainly not be around tomorrow.
And the specifics of what is likely to be around tomorrow are
increasingly hard to predict.
(11) Difficulty of predicting the timing and nature of advances/changes in
technology and its operational systems ("Unpredictability"). The New
Property and the Frequent Change characteristics result in another
attribute-unpredictability. Although the first ten attributes of
information technology seemingly point to the directions in which
this technology will continue to proceed, predicting the details of
future developments is like shooting at a fast-moving, often invisible
target.
The value of identifying these attributes of electronic communications
technology is best illustrated by examining these attributes in the context of a
particular legal regime. Before doing so in Part III, Part II provides necessary
background with a brief description of the process of clearance and settlement
in the U.S. securities markets.
11. See, for example, Sanford Grossman, Trading Technology and Financial Market Stabitity, in
Daniel R. Siegel, ed, Innovation and Technology in the Markets 47-57 (Probus, 1990); Richard 0.
Scribner, The Technological Revolution in Securities Trading: Can Regulation Keep Up?, in Anthony
Saunders & Lawrence J. White, eds, Technology and the Regulation of Financial Markets 19-29 (D.C.
Heath, 1986).
12. See, for example, Glaser, The Intersection of Technology and FinancialServices at 17-18 (cited in
note 10).
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II
SECURITIES MARKET CLEARANCE AND SETrLEMENT:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS AND PARTICIPANTS

Securities market operations applicable to the process of trading as well as
the processes that occur after trades are made (clearance and settlement) have
been radically transformed during the last quarter century or so. Many of the
most significant characteristics of modem securities markets result directly
from the application of advanced electronic information communication and
storage technology. In particular, these advances now permit a speed and
volume of market transactions that could not have been imagined during the
1960s. The following passage is illustrative:
Technological and institutional innovations have radically transformed financial
markets in the U.S. and around the world, permitting and encouraging spectacular
increases in the volume of securities trading of all kinds. In 1960, 766 million shares
were traded on the NYSE, while in 1987 more than 900 million shares changed hands
in an average week. More shares were traded on the lowest volume day in 1987 than
in any month in 1960. And more shares changed hands in the first 15 minutes of
trading on October 19 and 20, 1987 than in any week in 1960.
Increases in trading have been even more spectacular in other markets. In 1960 or
1970, there were no organized markets in derivative securities. Today, the dollar
value of contracts traded on the stock market futures market alone significantly
exceeds the volume of trade on the stock market itself-and the volume of trade in
stock market futures is nearly equalled by trade in index options ....
Today, there is
every reason to expect trading volumes to continue increasing. Already, the NYSE is
preparing itself for a one-billion-share day. And with increasing international linkages
among markets, an inexhaustible variety of securities are tradable 24 hours a day.
In the narrow sense of permitting trade to take place between consenting adults,
these statistics make it obvious that our financial markets have become much more
efficient over time. Unloading a one-million-dollar portfolio of stock easily might have
cost $10,000 or more in 1960; but today a functionally-equivalent transaction can be
carried out in the futures market for a couple of hundred dollars or less. To a great
extent, it is reductions in trading costs that have allowed volume to skyrocket so
dramatically. 1

These dramatic developments in the nature and volume of securities
market trading by market professionals-the so-called "front office"--could
not have taken place in the absence of equally profound developments in the
process of clearance and settlement-the so-called "back office." However
securities are traded (such as on organized exchanges or in an over-thecounter market), buyers must arrange to pay for securities bought and sellers
must arrange to transfer ownership of the securities sold. The arrangements
might call for each trader to meet face-to-face with each trading partner so
that the securities involved in each trade can be physically delivered to the
buyer against simultaneous payment to the seller in currency or check. But,
for active securities market participants who make many trades every business
day, that settlement structure would not work. The systems for clearing
13. Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When FinancialMarkets Work Too Well: A Case
for a Securities Transaction Tax, in Daniel R. Siegel, ed, Innovation and Technology in the Markets 151-52

(Probus, 1990). The impact of technology on the creation of new products was mentioned above.
See text at note 12.
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(comparing, matching, and confirming trades so that each party is assured
that the trades have been made according to the mutually agreed upon terms)
and settling (transferring interests in and paying for) securities trades reflect
attempts to replicate, in some fashion, the certainty and safety of the simple
face-to-face paradigm while avoiding its inefficiency and impracticability.
By the late 1960s, the back offices of the securities industry had fallen
hopelessly behind the front offices, thereby giving rise to what is now known
as the "paperwork crunch."' 14 The industry responded by creating a system
employing a securities depository to hold physical possession of securities,
thereby allowing its participants to transfer securities among themselves by
means of book entries made by the depository. i5
The system that currently handles clearance and settlement for the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX"),
and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") over-thecounter market involves both the Depository Trust Company ("DTC")' 6 and
the National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC").1 7 Settlement in
these markets occurs on the fifth business day following the date of a trade
(T+5). Almost every aspect of the system is highly automated, including
direct computer linkages between the trading systems and the clearance and
settlement system.'
Not only does electronic communication reduce the
movements of certificated securities among system participants, but it reduces
the movement of paper communications as well.
The principal system operated by NSCC is called the "continuous net
settlement" ("CNS") system. Following is a general description of how the
system works:
Only trades in securities eligible for deposit with DTC can be cleared and settled in
the CNS system, and on the settlement date [the fifth business day following the trade
date] all of the securities to be delivered must be on deposit with DTC. Prior to the
settlement date the trades among all of the participants are compared (matched) and
netted with respect to each securities issue, with each participant ultimately becoming
obligated to transfer or entitled to receive only a net quantity of securities that takes
into account all of that participant's trades in that security issue. Also prior to the
settlement date, NSCC becomes obligated to transfer and entitled to receive these
netted amounts to or from each participant. On the payments side, all amounts to be
paid and received by each broker-dealer participant also are netted, and NSCC
14. See American Bar Association, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Report
of the Committee on Stock Certificates 37-43 (Am Bar Assn, 1975). Some securities firms even failed
because of serious delays in payments for and deliveries of securities. SIPC and Customer Protection 1
(Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 1986).
15. The Depository Trust Co., Annual Report 1991 at 4 (1992) ("DTC 1991 Annual Report").
16. The Depository Trust Company, a New York limited purpose trust company, is the world's
largest securities depository. Id at 33. It was formed in 1973 as a successor to the business of the
New York Stock Exchange's Central Certificate Service, which was created to respond to the
paperwork crunch of the late 1960s. The Depository Trust Co., Annual Report 1989 at 6 (1990).
17. NSCC was formed in 1977 to provide post-trade clearance and settlement services for trades
on the NYSE, the AMEX, and the NASD over-the-counter trades; NSCC is owned jointly by the
NYSE, AMEX, and NASD. Robert J. Woldow, An Overview of the Role of the National Securities Clearing

Corporation in Equities Trading 1-2, 8 (unpublished manuscript, 1990). About 95% of all equities trades
in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASD markets are cleared and settled through NSCC. Id at 7.
18. Id at 2-3.
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becomes obligated to pay and entitled to receive payment to or from each participant.
Each participant becomes obligated to pay to or entitled to receive from NSCC only a
single sum on account of all of its trades for all issues to be settled on that date. In
sum, on each settlement date, each NSCC participant pays to or receives one sum of
money from NSCC and each NSCC participant transfers to or receives from NSCC, by
book entry on the books of DTC, a single quantity of each security issue involved.
Most large institutional investors employ a DTC participant custodian bank. Most
of these investors allow their custodian banks to leave their securities in the custodian
banks' accounts with DTC, registered in the name of DTC's nominee, although in
theory the investors could request their DTC member-intermediary to withdraw and
hold them or request that certificates be issued in the investors' own names. Thus,
these market participants normally have no direct relationship with the issuers of
securities of which they claim beneficial ownership. DTC participants expect DTC's
nominee to become the registered owner of securities, and non-participant investors,
in turn, look to the DTC members or other intermediaries.19

The netting of transfer and payment obligations in the CNS system reduces

the aggregate amount of obligations that are outstanding and unperformed at
any particular time. 20 Because there is always a risk that a participant will not

pay or transfer securities on the settlement date (settlement risk), 2 ' the
netting-induced reduction in unperformed obligations reduces the aggregate
risk in the system. The aggregate risk also could be reduced by shortening
the time between the trade date and the settlement date.2 2 The Group of
Thirty ("G-30") Report recommends that settlement occur not later than
T+3.

23

Settlement in the CNS system exemplifies "street-side" settlementsettlement among the financial intermediaries acting for their disclosed or
(usually) undisclosed customers. "Customer-side" settlement refers to (1) the
payment to financial intermediaries by buying customers, (2) the transfer (by
physical delivery or otherwise) of securities to buying customers, (3) the
payment by financial intermediaries to selling customers, and (4) if the
securities are not already controlled by the financial intermediary, the delivery
of securities to financial intermediaries by selling customers. When the
financial intermediary for a selling customer already controls the securities
(such as in the financial intermediary's account with DTC), it is unnecessary
for the customer to deliver to the financial intermediary the physical securities
certificates to be sold. Similarly, when a buying customer allows its financial
19. Mooney, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 318-20 (cited in note 5) (footnotes omitted). Funds and
securities settlements in the CNS system are substantially (although not strictly) simultaneous (called
"delivery versus payment" or "DVP" on the street), thereby reducing, but not wholly eliminating,
the risk that a participant could receive securities in its DTC account and subsequently fail to make a
net funds payment due NSCC. Note also that the system might be structured so that parties could
negotiate and reach agreement as to the settlement date for a trade (that is the procedure in the
government securities over-the-counter market), such as T+ 1, T+5, or T+ 10. However, there
seems to be a general consensus that the benefits of standardized settlement dates in a netting system
such as the CNS outweigh any perceived benefits of flexibility.
20. G-30 Report at 9, 36-43 (cited in note 3); see also Report on Netting Schemes 6 (Bank for
International Settlements, 1989) (making the same point concerning netting in the payments
system).
21. The default could arise out of insolvency or illiquidity of a system participant.
22. See Ananth Madhavan, Morris Mendelson & Junius W. Peake, Risky Business: The Clearance
and Settlement of Financial Transactions, 3 J Intl Sec Mkts 7 (1989).
23. G-30 Report at 14-15 (cited in note 3).
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intermediary to continue to control the securities, it eliminates the need for a
subsequent physical delivery of securities certificates to the customer and
another subsequent redelivery to an intermediary when the customer is ready
to sell.
In part because the securities must be "in the system" (that is, on deposit
with DTG) for settlement to occur in the CNS system, active market
participants typically allow a financial intermediary to retain control of their
securities at all times. 2 4 Many individual "retail" customers also prefer the
convenience of allowing their securities firm intermediaries to control
securities for their account. Similarly, because not all banks and securities
firms who control securities for their customers are direct DTC participants,
some of them allow other ("upper-tier") financial intermediaries to control
25
securities for them.
This phenomenon of financial intermediary control necessarily involves
risks. Securities firms and banks sometimes fail. If a financial intermediary
were to fail and the securities available to that intermediary were insufficient
to cover its customers' claims, the claims might not be satisfied. 26 Investors
with smaller portfolios controlled by registered broker-dealers can look to the
27
Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") or private insurance
for protection. Investors not fully protected by SIPC generally select their
28
intermediaries wisely.
Current law deals with financial intermediary risk in a variety of ways. In
addition to SIPC protection for some investors, financial intermediaries are
regulated so as to make failures less likely and to make it more likely that there
will be sufficient securities available for customer claims when an intermediary
24. For institutional investors such as insurance and investment companies, the financial
intermediary normally will be a "custodian" bank, not the broker used to effect a trade in the market.
See Mooney, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 324 n53 (cited in note 5).
25. For example, a customer (C) might have a securities account with its financial intermediary
broker (1-1), which controls securities for its customers (including C) by maintaining an account as a
customer of another, "upper-tier" financial intermediary (1-2). 1-2, in turn, might control securities
for its customers (including 1-1) by maintaining an account as a customer of yet another "upper-tier"
financial intermediary (1-3). 1-3 might be a depository, such as DTC, 1-2 might be a large national
firm, and I-1 might be a smaller regional or local firm.
26. For a discussion of the treatment of customer claims in securities firm insolvency
proceedings, see Michael E. Don & Josephine Wang, Stockbroker Liquidations Under the Securities Investor
ProtectionAct and Their Impact on Securities Transfers, 12 Cardozo L Rev 509, 527- 47 (1990); Mooney, 12
Cardozo L Rev at 351-64 (cited in note 5).
27. Customers of broker-dealers registered under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
receive protection (analogous to deposit insurance) from SIPC against shortfalls in customer
securities pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 ("SIPA"), 15 USC §§ 78aaa 78111 (1988). When SIPA applies, a customer is entitled to advances from the SIPC fund of up to
$500,000 (although advances relating to claims for cash are limited to $100,000 per customer). Id
§ 78fff-3(a). Many securities firms provide additional privately issued insurance covering customer
claims, often in the amount of $2.5 million and sometimes in a greater amount ($10 million, for
example).
28. Customer losses in excess of SIPC coverage have been quite modest in the case of brokerdealer insolvency since SIPA became effective in 1971. See Mooney, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 325 n55
(cited in note 5). Losses on account of shortfalls in customer securities in bank failures, which are
not covered by SIPA, have been virtually nonexistent. Id.
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does fail. 2 9 Existing law dealing with the property rights of customers upon
an intermediary's insolvency, however, does not provide complete protection
for investors in the event of a shortfall. It does identify the nature and scope
of the risks so that market participants can arrange their affairs and the
30
systems accordingly.
The next part of this article considers the impact of the attributes of
information technology on commercial law in the contexts of the transfer of
securities and clearance and settlement in the securities markets. The
discussion also offers some more general insights concerning the creation,
administration, and interpretation of laws and regulations in an environment
dominated by information technology.
III
LAW AND REGULATION:

APPLYING THE TAXONOMY OF INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGY ATTRIBUTES

This part considers the attributes of information technology in four
discrete but related contexts: (1) property law, (2) the legal regulation of
systems and system participants, (3) assessing the application of technology
and the market for systems, and (4) choices concerning the source and
manner of legal regulation.
A.

Property Law

Consider three means of transferring a property interest in investment
securities under article 8 of the UCC: (1) physical delivery of certificated
securities ("stone age transfer"), 3 1 (2) book-entry registration of an interest in
uncertificated securities on the books of the issuer ("registration bookentry"),3 2 and (3) book-entry transfer on the books of a financial intermediary
33
that controls securities for the transferee ("intermediary book-entry").
29. Broker-dealers are subject to rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
dealing with the control and, in some cases, "segregation" of customer securities. See SEC Rule
15c3-3, 17 CFR § 240.15c3-3 (1991). Banks in the United States are subject to less elaborate rules
but nevertheless are expected to maintain sufficient securities to cover all customer claims. See
Mooney, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 327 n62 (cited in note 5). Both securities firms and banks are subject
to elaborate regulatory and supervisory schemes. See id at 326-27.
30. See Mooney, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 313-15 (cited in note 5).
31. "Transfer of a security or a limited interest (including a security interest) therein to a
purchaser occurs only: (a) at the time he or a person designated by him acquires possession of a
certificated security." UCC § 8-313(l)(a). Section 8-313(1) specifies an exclusive listing of the
means by which a property interest in a security may be transferred to a purchaser. Article 8

securities are either "certificated" or "uncertificated." Id § 8-102(i)(c). Certificated securities are
"represented by an instrument," id § 8-102(1)(a), whereas uncertificated securities are not
represented by an instrument." Id § 8-102(l)(b).
32. Transfer of a security or a limited interest (including a security interest) therein to a
purchaser occurs only "at the time the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncertificated security is
registered to him or a person designated by him." Id § 8-313(l)(b).
33. Transfer of a security or a limited interest (including a security interest) therein to a
purchaser occurs only:
(d) at the time a financial intermediary... sends him confirmation of the purchase and also
by book entry or otherwise identifies as belonging to the purchaser
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Stone age transfer continues to occur, to be sure, but intermediary book-entry
transfer of securities clearly represents the norm in the securities markets.
The technology-enhanced systems for clearing and settlement have had much
to do with this intermediary control phenomenon. Thus, the intermediary
risk discussed above has become the norm as well. Connection of a securities
claimant to the securities issuer by registration book-entry could, however,
eliminate intermediary risk during the time period the registration remains
effective.
1. Registration Book-Entry for Uncertificated Securities. The regime created for
uncertificated securities pursuant to the 1977 revisions to article 8 is a
dramatic example of a rare occurrence-statutory creation of a new genre of
property, not yet in existence, accompanied by a corresponding new legal
regime for that property. 34 This approach was criticized, 35 but the drafters'
("chicken-and-egg") response-that no one could issue, employ, or devise a
system for uncertificated securities in the absence of a legal regime for themseems sound.3 6 Yet registration book-entry plays no meaningful role in
today's securities markets; for all practical purposes, truly uncertificated
securities are non-existent. Although uncertificated securities were seen as a
response to the "paperwork crunch," 3 7 the depository system and
information technology-aided methods of clearance and settlement basically
solved that problem even before the revised article 8 was promulgated.
Consequently, were uncertificated securities to become the norm, there would
not necessarily be any material change in otherwise prevailing patterns of
transfer and securities "holding," except that DTC would become the
(i) a specific certificated security in the financial intermediary's possession;
(ii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are part of a fungible bulk of certificated
securities in the financial intermediary's possession or of uncertificated securities
registered in the name of the financial intermediary; or
(iii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are part of a fungible bulk of securities
shown on the account of the financial intermediary on the books of another financial
intermediary.
Id § 8-313(l)(d). Transfers of "a specific certificated security;" pursuant to clause (i) are unusual in
the securities markets, most intermediary book-entry transfers being transfers of interests in fungible
bulks effected under clauses (ii) or (iii). See Mooney, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 370-71, 420 (cited in note
5).
34. For descriptions of the process leading to the 1977 article 8 revisions and the principal
features of the revised article, see UCC app I at 925 (cited in note 4) (Reporter's Introductory
Comment); Martin J. Aronstein, Robert Haydock, Jr. & Donald A. Scott, Article 8 Is Ready, 93 Harv L
Rev 889 (1980).
35. See Peter F. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 92 Harv L Rev 1013, 1073 (1979) (noting that there was no "hue and cry for
uncertificated securities at the present time" and calling upon the drafters to reconsider the revised
article 8).
36. Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, 93 Harv L Rev at 913 (cited in note 34) ("The problem has all
the aspects of the proverbial chicken-and-egg. The securities industry cannot intelligently design
uncertificated systems until the rules have been established. And no one can be entirely confident
that the rules are totally adequate until they are used.").
37. Id at 890.
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physical
registered owner of uncertificated securities instead of maintaining
38
name.
its
in
registered
securities
possession of certificated
The fate of the uncertificated security exemplifies the impact on the lawmaking process of information technology's Frequent Change characteristic.
Laws based on today's world may be inadequate or unresponsive to
tomorrow's world, and the Frequent Change aspect of information
technology exacerbates this problem. Moreover, in the context of uniform
state laws such as the UCC, the excruciatingly slow process of drafting,
promulgating, and enacting even makes prompt reaction to today's world
problematic. Indeed, two states (plus the District of Columbia) have not yet
enacted the revised article 8, some fifteen years after promulgation!3 9
Were the enactment problems solved or materially reduced, another
plausible perspective on uncertificated securities is more optimistic. Could
the Storage Capacity, Transmission Speed, Ease of Access, Revision Speed,
and Reduced Cost attributes of information technology be employed in a
system where registration book-entry would be the norm but the efficiencies
of current clearance and settlement systems would be maintained or even
enhanced? If so, intermediary risk could be substantially reduced without the
need for deliveries of certificated securities to and from investors.
Currently, customers who do not wish to allow an intermediary to control
their securities may request that certificates be delivered to them. 40 When a
customer desires to sell those securities, however, the customer must deliver
the certificates to a broker properly indorsed. 4 1 That could present a serious
problem for implementation of the G-30 recommendation that settlement
(payment and delivery) occur on the third business day following the trade
date (T+3). After a move from a T+5 to a T+3 system, some retail
customers might not be able to deliver in a timely fashion physical securities
they have sold through brokers. 4 2 One problem, then, is how to permit retail
investors to eschew continuing intermediary control (and risk) while
providing an efficient system for getting the securities in and out of the
clearing and settlement system, which does require intermediary control on
the settlement date.
38. Actually, securities controlled by DTC are registered in the name of a nominee partnership
that it controls, Cede & Co. See DTC 1991 Annual Report at 36 (cited in note 15).
39. Telephone conversation with John M. McCabe, Legislative Director, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Aug 26, 1992).
40. Principal exceptions are U.S. treasury securities (all book-entry) and certain "book-entry
only" municipal securities, the latter involving only one certificate that can be registered only to a
securities depository, such as DTC. See DTC 1991 Annual Report at 26-27 (cited in note 15). In the
case of U.S. treasury securities, customers can achieve the status of a registered owner of book-entry

securities on the books of the government through the "Treasury Direct" system. See 31 CFR
§§ 357.20 - 357.32 (1991) (regulations governing the Treasury Direct system).
41. Also, the broker would either guarantee the customer's indorsement or require a bank
signature guarantee. See note 44.
42. It has been estimated that "approximately 90% of the securities sold by retail customers are
in possession of their financial intermediaries by T+3." Group of Thirty Clearance and Settlement
Project, Status Report and Request for Comment 8 (U.S. Working Committee, 1990).
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Eliminating paper certificates and moving to a world of uncertificated
securities would not, alone, solve this problem. If an investor were the
registered owner on the issuer's books, the investor would have to give its
43
broker an "instruction" to be delivered to the issuer or its transfer agent.
Although instructions could be given electronically, that would be
problematic for many retail customers unless new systems for giving
instructions-such as instructions on automated teller machines ("ATMs")were employed. 4 4 Alternatively, a selling customer could be required to
deliver physical securities (or a written instruction in the case of uncertificated
securities) to its broker as a condition to the broker's execution of a sell order
for the securities. That approach would solve the problem, but it might be
seen as an unacceptable restriction on the expected liquidity of marketable
securities.
The G-30 U.S. Working Committee 4 5 has considered a proposal that offers
a plausible prospect for connecting retail investors with the registration books
of issuers while also providing easy entrance to and exit from the clearing and
settlement system. The proposed electronic communications system, called
46
the Direct Registration Clearing System ("DRCS") might work as follows:

(1) A purchasing investor could choose whether to have a
conventional securities account with an intermediary (that is,
intermediary control of a fungible bulk of securities) or to have its
interest registered directly on the books of an issuer (that is,
47
registration book-entry).
(2) Street-side settlement of a trade made for a purchasing investor
would occur in the DTC-NSCC system as it currently does.
Immediately after settlement (on T+3), the broker would effect
customer-side settlement by causing the broker's DTC account (for
43. See UCC § 8-308(4) (defining "instruction" as "an order to the issuer of an uncertificated
security requesting that the transfer, pledge, or release from pledge of the uncertificated security
specified therein be registered"). Some issuers keep their own registration books and some use
third-party transfer agents to keep the registration books. In the context of maintenance of the
corporate registration books, "issuer" and "transfer agent" generally are used interchangeably to
mean the entity responsible for keeping the issuer's books.
44. See UCC § 8-308(5)(b) (providing that "[an instruction originated by an appropriate
person" can be "a communication to the issuer in any form agreed upon in a writing signed by the
issuer and an appropriate person"). Because of the duties and liabilities imposed on issuers and
transfer agents, they ensure that indorsements and signatures pertaining to transfers of registered
ownership are authorized and virtually always require signature guarantees by banks or brokers. See
UCC §§ 8-401 (duties of issuer to register a transfer) and 8-402(l)(a) (right of issuer to require a
signature guarantee); Egon Guttman, Modern Securities Transfers 13-1 to 13-38 (Warren, Gorham &
Lamont, 1987) (discussing signature guarantees).
45. The U.S. Working Committee is a private group organized by securities industry
participants to address implementation of the G-30 Report in the U.S. markets.
46. A possible model for DRCS has been outlined by the U.S. Working Committee. Group of
Thirty Clearance & Settlement Project, Implementing The Group of Thirty Recommendations in the
United States VI-19 to VI-45 (U.S. Working Committee, 1990) ("G-30, Implementing the Group of
Thirty Recommendations"). The following description generally follows that model, although much
detail is omitted here.
47. The system contemplates that the securities would be uncertificated, but it could coexist
with a system that also allows investors to have the option of receiving paper, certificated securities.
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the securities issue involved) to be debited and the DTC account of
the transfer agent for the issuer to be credited by a quantity
corresponding to the investor's purchase. 48 The broker also would
give instructions through DRCS that would result in the broker's
account on the transfer agent's books being debited and the investor
being credited with the securities on the transfer agent's (that is,
issuer's) books. An article 8 initial transaction statement would be
49
sent to the investor.
(3) A selling investor would contact its broker and request the sale.
The broker, through DRCS, would confirm with the transfer agent
that the investor is the registered owner of the securities to be sold.
If the securities were there, a "lock" would be put on the quantity
involved and the investor could not deal with those securities
thereafter.
(4) On the settlement date (T+3), the transfer agent would debit
the investor's account and credit the broker on the transfer agent's
books. The transfer agent then would instruct DTC to debit its
account on DTC's books and credit the broker's account. The
securities would be "in the system" so that the broker could
"deliver" them in settlement of the trade.
There remains another problem with DRCS that would have to be
resolved. How would the selling investor give the broker the authority to act
for the investor in communicating with the transfer agent? If the investor
must deliver a written instruction, then the system has not accomplished its
goals. And if the investor gives the broker a blanket pre-authorization to act
50
for it, then much of the intermediary risk would remain.
Current technology could solve this problem of how the investor would
put its securities back into the system. For example, the market could employ
a system similar to the message authentication code developed by the Bank of
Japan ("BOJ") for its newly automated registration system for Japanese
government bonds. 5 ' Applied to DRCS, the system might work like this: The
48. Each transfer agent, including issuers acting for themselves, would have a special account
with DTC for this purpose.
49. See UCC §§ 8-408(1) - (4) (requiring issuer to send an "initial transaction statement" within
two business days after registration of a transfer and requiring the initial transaction statement to be
"'awritten statement" that is "signed by or on behalf of the issuer"). Although an "instruction" may
be given in a non-written form, an initial transaction statement must be in writing. Id; see note 44.
The ABA Interim Report calls for amendments to UCC §§ 1.-201(46) (defining "written" and
"writing") and 8-408 so as to embrace electronic communication. ABA Interim Report at 46-47
(cited in note 5).
50. If the broker had been given a blanket pre-authorization to act for the investor, then the
investor's claim would be treated the same way as a conventional securities account in the broker's
insolvency proceeding-that is, the customer would not be given a direct claim against the securities
but would share with other customers in the pool of "customer property." See Mooney, 12 Cardozo
L Rev at 352-54 (cited in note 5). With pre-authorization, the desired risk reduction benefits of
direct registration would not, therefore, be available under current law.
51. The system devised by the Bank ofJapan ("BOJ") is used to authenticate a buyer's agreement
to receive a transfer. However, it could just as well be employed to authenticate a seller's wishes. A
brief description of the system follows:
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investor would contact DRCS by telephone or ATM. By use of a personal
identification number ("PIN") and standardized identification codes, the
customer would indicate the securities issue and the quantity to be sold.
DRCS would then give the customer a transaction code that would be
matched to the trade in DRCS. The investor would give this number to its
broker when placing the sell order. When executing the sell order, the broker
would use the number given by DRCS to the customer. DRCS and the
transfer agent would then know that the broker is authorized to make the
specific trade for the selling investor. DRCS would thereby utilize the
Centralization attribute of information technology by employing a centralized
communications network with remote user access.
What would the emergence of a system like DRCS (or any other system
grounded on uncertificated securities) indicate about the approach taken by
the drafters of the 1977 revisions to article 8? Would it prove that they were
enormously prescient? I have found nothing specific in the drafting history or
contemporary literature that indicates that the drafters had any specific
conceptualization of how uncertificated securities would reduce the movement of
paper generally, as opposed to the movement of certificated securities.
Consequently, one could claim that the eventual use of uncertificated
securities in such a system would be merely a lucky break. I would offer a
different view that is of more general applicability. By creating a framework
for uncertificated securities, and by unburdening the legal regime from its
dependence on certificated securities, the revised article 8 has provided an
opportunity for those who might create different systems for trading, clearing,

and settling. Perhaps it did not go far enough, but the idea was and is sound.
There are some more general lessons here for law makers. The
Unpredictability attribute of information technology must be acknowledged,
but it need not be paralyzing. For example, the writers of statutes and
regulations should develop a paper-neutral approach. The case at hand, a
system of property law for paperless intangibles, can be imagined as one
where someone is keeping an electronic scoreboard that matches owners with
The securities-wire system will require a registration transfer order from only one party (the
seller), while the current regulation requires orders from both the seller and the buyer.
Thus, the new system will employ a message authentication code (MAC) to verify the
intention of transfer of the other party (the buyer). MAC will be formulated by combining
the transaction data with a secret key utilizing a special algorithm. The MAC message will
be tamperproof unless the key is known. The system will work in the following manner: (1)
BOJ provides participants with a MAC key beforehand, (2) when a transaction is made, the
buyer formulates the MAC (f(a,x)) on the basis of the key (a) and the transaction data (x),
and transmits it to the seller, (3) the seller then inputs data (x) and the MAC f(a,x) into BOJNET [the BOJ's computer network for transferring funds and Japanese government
securities], (4) BOJ checks that the MAC [is] formulated according to the buyer's key (a) and
the transaction data (x) input by the seller. Authenticity of the seller's intention is
confirmed by checking the information on the ID Cards [required for communicating in
BOJ-NET] of the [seller's] authorized officers, etc. After verification, BOJ processes the
registration transfer.
Payment System Project Team, Outline of Bank of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-NET) 2122 (The Bank of Japan, 1989).
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property. 52 In registration book-entry, it is the issuers of securities (or their
transfer agents) that maintain the records of the securities owners. As to how
the scoreboard is turned on and off and how the scores are recorded, the law
should say as little as possible. Imagine that a securities owner could
electronically "dip into" the issuer's records in order to "see" the owner's
recorded interest. Or imagine that the owner's broker were to confirm that
the owner's interest was recorded by the issuer. In either case, initial
transaction statements from the issuer to the owner, even if electronically
communicated, might not be necessary. Perhaps, to the greatest extent
possible, statutory property law should omit as many of the details of how
interests are recorded and unrecorded, leaving the detail to more easilyadjusted administrative regulation of financial intermediaries or markets or
both.
2.

Intermediary Book-Entry for Certificated and Uncertificated Securities.

Some of

the concluding observations in the previous section also are applicable in the
context of transfers of interests in fungible bulks of securities by financial
intermediaries to their customers through intermediary book-entry. In this
case, the financial intermediary is maintaining the scoreboard for its
customers. Elsewhere, I have criticized the statutory language that deals with
5
intermediary book-entry transfers-UCC sections 8-313(1)(d)(ii) and (iii). 3

On a more basic level, I have challenged the property construct in article 8,
which requires the statute reader to imagine that a customer of a financial
intermediary has a conventional property interest in a fungible bulk of
securities, and I have argued that in the fungible bulk context, approaches
such as tracing and first-in-time priority rules are inappropriate.5 4 Even
under current law, what a customer receives upon an intermediary book-entry
transfer essentially is merely a claim against the intermediary-a claim that
55 If
bears little resemblance to a conventional property interest in securities.
the intermediary does not fail, the customer receives the benefit of the
securities that are "in" the customer's account. If the intermediary fails, the
customer receives its entitlement under applicable insolvency law.
Information technology has played a key role in the modern systems for
clearance and settlement that have led in large part to the prevailing
dominance of intermediary control in the marketplace. At the present time,
however, the existence of, location of, and value of securities controlled by an
intermediary and the means by which that intermediary controls securities are
invisible to customers claiming through that financial intermediary. As
discussed in the previous section, information technology easily could be
52. I have borrowed this imagery from Professor Rogers. SeeJames Steven Rogers, Negotiability,
Property, and Identity, 12 Cardozo L Rev 471, 504-05 (1990).
53. See Mooney, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 331-42, 425-27 (cited in note 5).
54. Id at 349-51, 365-97. The 1992 draft of article 8 adequately responds to my critique; it
adopts the substance of each of my principal proposals for reform.
55. This effect of intermediary book-entry can be contrasted with registration book-entry, in
which case the transferee receives a direct claim against the issuer of the securities.
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employed to disconnect the customers from financial intermediaries and to
connect them to issuers. Also, it could be used to connect customer claims to
some sort of centralized scoreboard ("centralized book-entry"), instead of
registration book-entry on the issuer's books, where the customers' discrete
claims could be recorded. For example, investor claims could be reflected on
the books of DTC at the end of each day, even though the investors would not
be direct participants in the NSCC-DTC street-side system for securities and
funds settlement.5 6 Alternatively, the central system could be operated by a
government, just as governments now operate filing and recording systems.
Direct investor communications with the central scoreboard, as discussed in
connection with the DRCS proposal, could be devised. In effect, these
systems would substitute a presumably less risky central intermediary, itself
connected to the various securities issuers, for the intermediary with which
the investor otherwise would have a securities account.
A system like DRCS or a centralized book-entry system might or might not
provide aggregate net benefits when compared with other alternatives,
including the current systems. And either could be achieved with little or no
change in law. Certainly it is not the absence of adequate technology that
stands in the way. Instead, it is the fact that the interested parties have not
seen fit to make such fundamental changes.
3. Security Systems, Privacy, and Breakdown. The Ease of Access and Speed of
Access attributes of information technology pose challenges to those charged
57
with keeping systems secure and free from unauthorized tampering.
Although these concerns are in no way peculiar to systems that keep track of
property rights, certainly the significance of maintaining the integrity of these
systems is self-evident. In addition, the Storage Capacity and Transmission
56. A similar approach would be employed by a new product under consideration by Midwest
Securities Trust Company ("MSTC"), a securities depository. That product-called an "individual
Safekeeping Account"-would permit individual, retail customers to have special accounts with
MSTC. See Midwest Securities Trust Company, Individual Safekeeping Account, A Report for U.S.
Working Committee--Group of Thirty Clearance and Settlement Project, DRS Industry Participant
Subgroup (Midwest Securities Trust Co., 1991). The product's operation would be similar to the
DRCS system sketched out above, except that investors would end up with credits in securities
accounts with MSTC instead of direct registration on the books of the issuer.
The TAURUS system in the United Kingdom, which has not yet been made operational,
illustrates another alternative. That system would involve shareholder accounts with regulated
"controllers"-either a "company controller" (somewhat analogous to a transfer agent) or a
"commercial controller." Periodically, each issuing company's registration books would be updated
to reflect shareholder interests as reflected on the books of controllers. However, the controllers
would have "entitlements" for all of the shares that they control for shareholders. The entitlements
would enable the controllers to transfer registered ownership of those shares on an issuing
company's books. In that respect, the system bears some resemblance to DRCS coupled with a preauthorization given to an investor's financial intermediary. For an overview of the TAURUS system,
see The Uncertificated Securities Regulations, A Consultative Document Part I (Dept of Trade and
Industry, 1990). Part III of that document contains the draft regulations, and Part II contains a
summary of each provision of the draft regulations.
57.

See Edwin M. Cortez & Edward John Kazlauskas, Managing Information Systems & Technologies

89-91, 104-05 (Neal-Schuman, 1986) (discussing various methods of protecting access to data
processing systems) ("[A]ny facility must safeguard its operation against people-caused problems
such as theft, human error or ignorance, and malicious mischief." Id at 104.).
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Capacity characteristics heighten the risks of unwanted interference. These
characteristics also raise the stakes for those who wish to keep their affairs
private. 58
The stakes of the present securities system are also high when the
prospects of a system participant default or a system breakdown are
considered. The interdependence of financial intermediaries in the process of
clearance and settlement of securities and funds transactions offers the
prospect of systemic risk of multiple defaults in the event of a system
participant's insolvency or illiquidity. 59 Similar risks are posed by the
possibility of a breakdown of technological applications, and the System
Complexity and Technology Complexity attributes make these risks real. 60
B.

Regulation of Systems and Systems for Regulation

The securities markets and many professional market participants are
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), principally
under the authority of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Of particular
58. As Ethan Katsh has noted:
Instances of loss of privacy or problems in enforcement of privacy laws are part of a general
difficulty in controlling information. What the difficulties now being experienced by the
copyright, obscenity, and privacy laws suggest is that any institution in the new
communications environment will find it difficult to keep a firm hold on proprietary
information. Both individuals and governments are learning that a central feature of
electronic information is that it is in motion as often as it is stationary. Each time such
information moves, it is subject to copying, editing, and revising. Exclusive control of
information and the power associated with that control is, therefore, difficult to achieve not
only by individuals but by governments as well.
Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law at 194 (cited in note 8).

See also U.S.

Congress, Federal Government Information Technology: Electronic Record Systems and Individual
Privacy (Govt Printing Office, 1986) (OTA-CIT-296).
59. See, for example, Systemic Risks in Securities Markets 31-38 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development, 1991).
60. Marcia Stigum's colorful description of two "computer snafus," involving two clearing banks
in the government securities market, is illustrative.
Irving's snafu. One fine day a clerk set a switch on an Irving Bank computer so that
instructions that were supposed to go out over the Fed wire were all written to disk instead
.... We were," said an ex-Irving officer, "acting as a kind of black hole for securities."
"Around 3:15 p.m., just after the Fed wire closed, we discovered that we had, thanks to
our mis-set computer switch, a problem: we had not received $4 billion of funds that we
thought we had .... "
"We became a black hole for funds. No offer rate [in the funds market] was too high for
us. Finally.... we had bought everything there was; .... At that point, we still had about
1.7 billion to go. To get that, we had to go to the Fed .... "
Computer errors can be costly. Interest on $1.7 billion, even on an over-night
borrowing, is bound to amount to a tidy sum.
BONY's snafu.... BONY [Bank of New York] pulled a boner that caused the Irving OD
[overdraft] to pale in significance. On a November Thursday in 1985, BONY was preparing
to change software in its computer system when trouble hit: BONY could accept deliveries
of securities, but it couldn't make them. BONY's technicians took almost 28 hours to clean
up that malfunction; during that time, deliveries and payments in the market for Treasuries
came to a near standstill. . . . BONY had to borrow $22 billion from the [Federal Reserve
Bank of New York]. That borrowing, said to be the largest ever from the discount window,
cost BONY $5 million and a bit of embarrassment.
Marcia Stigum, After the Trade: Dealer and Clearing Bank Operations in Money Market and Government

Securities 117 (Dow Jones-Irwin, 1988).
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interest here is the fact that the SEC regulates "clearing agencies" such as
DTC and NSCC. 6 t In connection with issuing orders approving the
registration of clearing agencies, the SEC reviews in detail the operational
aspects of proposed systems for clearing and settlement such as NSCC's CNS
62
system.
Regulators must overcome System Complexity and Technology
Complexity if they are adequately to understand and assess the risks and
relationships that inhere in operational systems. This regulation and
supervision requires much more than reviewing and analyzing financial
statement-like reports and data. It often requires playing out "what if"
scenarios, such as those posed by the possibility of financial institution
insolvency and illiquidity.
Surprisingly, information technology seems to have had remarkably little
impact on the basic approach of the SEC's regulation and supervision.
Although a general critique of financial institution regulation is not within the
scope of this article, it may be worth asking whether information technology
could provide a new model for regulation and supervision. In lieu of
traditional approaches such as notice and reporting requirements, spot audits,
and the like, 63 one can imagine a financial intermediary as a patient in a
hospital's intensive care ward (an apt and easy bit of imagery in the case of
some financial institutions). Electronic "nodes" would be attached to all of
the financial intermediary's "vital organs." The regulators would monitor the
intermediary's "vital signs" on a "real time" basis. They could immediately
(or almost immediately) discover changes (such as withdrawals of capital or
shortfalls of customer securities). Indeed, the complete financial condition of
the intermediary would be continuously exposed.
61. Clearing agencies are required to be registered under § 17A of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. 15 USC § 78q-l(b) (1988).
62. See Exchange Act Rel No 20,221, 48 Fed Reg 45167-8 (Oct 3, 1983) (ordering registration
of DTC, NSCC, and several other entities as full clearing agencies).
63. As to the limitations of current techniques, consider some events preceding the bankruptcy
of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert Group Inc. ("Group"), the parent of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc.
("DBL"), a registered broker-dealer. DuringJanuary 1990, without notifying the SEC or the NYSE,
Group withdrew approximately 50% of DBL's excess capital in order to meet a liquidity crisis in
servicing Group's short-term unsecured debt. Registered broker-dealers are required to maintain
certain minimum net capital. See Guttman, Modern Securities Transfers at 19-11 to 19-20 (cited in note
44) (discussing reporting and net capital requirements for broker-dealers). Concerning the Group
and DBL financial problems, see The Issues Surrounding the Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong, 2d Sess
7 (1990) (statement of Richard C. Breeden, SEC Chairman). As Group's crisis grew worse, the SEC
became aware of the problems. On February 7, 1990, the SEC notified Group and DBL in writing
that further depletion of DBL's capital would not be permitted except with prior notice to and
approval by the SEC and the NYSE. Id. On February 12, the NYSE (in consultation with the SEC)
denied approval for an additional withdrawal from DBL's capital because the prospects for Group's
solution of its liquidity problems had become poor. Id at 41-42. After the markets closed on
February 13, Group filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id at 44-46.
SEC Chairman Breeden has placed some blame for the SEC's surprise on the SEC's lack of
supervisory control over broker-dealers' holding companies, such as Group. However, the SEC does
have supervisory power over broker-dealers such as DBL, but for a period of time the SEC was not
aware of the material withdrawals of DBL's capital.
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A continuous electronic monitoring of financial intermediaries might allow
regulators to make it less likely that financial intermediaries would fail and
less likely that a shortfall in customer securities would occur were a failure to
occur. This "tripwire" approach would address the most significant
manifestations of insolvencies and financial distress in recent years-the
health of the financial institutions on which the world's economies depend for
a vast array of services and credit.
C.

Assessing the Application of Technology and the Market for Systems

The Frequent Change characteristic of information technology does not
ensure that systems representing optimal applications of technology will
actually occur. Conversely, the fact that a problem can be addressed by the
application of an information technology system does not necessarily mean that
it is appropriate to apply that system. The DRCS proposal is illustrative.
The principal proponents of DRCS within the G-30 U.S. Working
Committee have been the transfer agents and issuers.r 4 A review of the
materials generated to date indicates that their support may be grounded
largely on perceived self-interest that is unrelated to solving the problem of
achieving T+3. The transfer agents apparently see direct registration
through special transfer agent accounts with DTC as a means to entrench and
even enhance their roles in the market. 6 5 The issuers see DRCS as leading to
more direct registration and less fungible bulk intermediary control, thereby

64. The statement in the text and some of the statements that follow reflect my conclusions and
impressions based on numerous conversations with interested persons and my attendance at
meetings of the U.S. Working Committee's Legal and Regulatory Subgroup, on which I serve.
65. See G-30, Implementing the Group of Thirty Recommendations at VI-19 (cited in note 46)
("The Direct Registration Concept ... embraces an approach building upon a solid foundation of
current practices, procedures and technology. Many of the infrastructures for direct registration
statement record keeping exist and are well accepted and understood by investors and the transfer
industry."). DTC has expressed less enthusiasm:
Analysis of earlier versions of DRCS considered since the late 1960's shows why "that dog
won't hunt." It founders on the fact of the heavy automation investment it would require of
almost 2,000 corporate and municipal transfer agents, most of them small, since those
agents would have to communicate interactively with financial intermediaries and DTC. Add
to that the unknown large cost of linking brokers' offices in a computerized network
reaching all transfer agents to confirm the securities positions of customers placing sell
orders.
Memorandum from The Depository Trust Company to its Participants, The Group of Thirty (Nov
20, 1990). If the DTC assessment is accurate, perhaps it is primarily the more substantial transfer
agents that would stand to gain a competitive edge from DRCS. It also is reasonable to assume that
there would be more in and out entries on the transfer agents' books in a DRCS system, and,
consequently, the potential for more fees.
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revealing the identities of more of their shareholders."6 These positions are
67
clear examples of what Wiseman calls "offensive strategic thrusts."

The principal opponents of DRCS within the G-30 U.S. Working Group
seem to be DTC and the securities firms. For this reason, it now seems
unlikely that DRCS (at least in something like its present configuration) will
be implemented. The securities firms apparently fear, probably with good
reason, that DRCS will result in their losing customer accounts and customer
loyalty in executing trades. 68
It appears that the SEC will not encourage or impose a system like DRCS,
but instead will be content to let the market participants determine if and
when to implement such a system. 6 9 Even if something like DRCS would be
more efficient than current practices, it does not follow that the market would
be responsive, especially in the face of securities firm opposition. It may be
that high-volume, high-value institutional investors are not sufficiently
dissatisfied to insist on any change. And other retail investors might not
overcome the collective action problems that would impede efforts to
influence change. If material changes are to occur in the clearance and
settlement systems and the securities-holding practices of investors in the
United States, chances are that they will be inspired by competition from
70
other markets (such as Japan and Europe).
66. One report concluded that
DRCS will benefit corporate issuers by preserving and potentially increasing the number of
directly registered investor accounts. With direct corporate communication to investors, it
is reasonable to expect that corporate communication, proxy distribution, tabulation and
reporting could be accomplished faster, more efficiently and more economically than at
present.
G-30, Implementing the Group of Thirty Recommendations at VI-20 (cited in note 46). Of course, if
it is a good thing to create a communications system between issuers and their securities holders,
that could be done without the system constituting an ownership registry. Not satisfied, the report
continues with the following, rather amazing, hyperbolic non sequitur:
Increased investor participation and a direct link to the corporate issuer should result in a
greater sense of loyalty to the issuer, especially in times of crisis. This is seen as a means to
help bolster faith in the market and the American economy.
Id.
67. See Charles Wiseman, Strategy and Computers: Information Systems as Competitive Weapons 42-57
(Dow Jones-Irwin, 1985). In an "offensive strategic thrust," an organization applies information
technology not merely to automate or make more efficient the activities of its business, but to acquire
a substantially larger market share or otherwise to enhance its position.
68. See G-30, Implementing the Group of Thirty Recommendations at VI-22 (cited in note 46)
(listing goals of DRCS as including "portability of securities among broker/dealers and financial
intermediaries").
69. A portion of SEC Commissioner Mary L. Schapiro's remarks before a conference of the
Securities Industry Association has been summarized and quoted as follows:
[A] mechanism that would allow easy transfer, but provide necessary safeguards against
fraud, has not yet been perfected. Nor has the Working Committee identified an industry
group that is willing to "foot the bill for building and operating a direct registration
system." The Commission, opined Ms. Schapiro, would like to see a workable direct
registration system developed, but she added that the initiative for developing such a system
"rests squarely on the shoulders of private industry."
Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 5 (No 1428, Jan 2, 1991).
70. See OTA, Trading Around the Clock at 78-79 (cited in note 1) (discussing U.S. leadership in
harmonization of operational and regulatory schemes).
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Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of DRCS, 7 1 moving to a DRCS-like
system might be inefficient and unwise nonetheless. The process of assessing
technological change, although continuously evolving, has become an
increasingly important and sophisticated discipline. 72 Much has been written
about the risks of technological developments. Some, such as adherents to
the "Appropriate Technology" movement, have questioned the wisdom
(efficiency) of introducing advanced technology in certain societies and
contexts where they believe it may do more harm than good. 73 Others have
dwelled on technological developments (such as nuclear energy) that are
perceived as potentially dangerous to our health. 74 By way of analogy,
assessing information technology in the present context involves considering
whether the current system, a DRCS-like system, or some other system would
75
be more or less dangerous to our wealth.
A critique of the proposed DRCS system cannot be accommodated here,
but it may be helpful to identify some of the costs and benefits of such a
system.
(1) Second-Guessing T+3. Although shortening the time between
trade date and settlement tends to decrease aggregate risk, it does
not follow that the costs of imposing T+3 (including the
implementation of DRCS) necessarily justify this reduction of risk.
71. The most straightforward argument in support of adopting a DRCS-like system goes
something like the following: Moving to T+3 will reduce risk. Some selling retail customers
cannot/would not get their certificates in the system in time for T+3. It is a bad idea to force retail
investors to allow intermediaries to control their securities because the investors' perceptions of
intermediary risk may cause some of them to flee the market. Therefore, it is necessary to find a way
to shelter investors from intermediary control and risk, and to eliminate securities certificates, while
making it easy for investors to get their securities into and out of the intermediary system necessary
for clearing and settlement. DRCS could do this. It follows that something like DRCS should be
adopted.
I do not intend to suggest that the absence of something like DRCS is the only impediment to
changing the settlement day from T+5 to T+3. Not only is shortening the time between a trade and
a "delivery" problematic, but shortening the time between a trade and payment by the buyer also has
substantial market implications.
72. See generally, for example, Cortez & Kazlauskas, Managing Information Systems & Technologies
(cited in note 57); Janet Fulk & Charles Steinfield, eds, Organizations and Communication Technology
(Sage, 1990); Norbert Szyperski, et al, eds, Assessing the Impacts of Information Technology (Vieweg,

1983). The United States Congress has recognized the importance of rigorous examinations of
technology applications by establishing its Office of Technology Assessment. See 2 USC §§ 471, 472
(1988).
73. For a thorough survey and critique of the literature, see Kelvin W. Willoughby, Technology
Choice: A Critique of the Appropriate Technology Movement (Westview Press, 1990).

The origins of the

Appropriate Technology movement are found in the writings of Ernst Friedrich Schumacher about
what he called "intermediate technology." Id at 55-97.
74. See, for example, Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U Pa L
Rev 1027 (1990);James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Casefor Technological Optimism, 84

Mich L Rev 405 (1985).
75. For recent examples of assessments of the application of technology in the financial markets,
see generally OTA, Effects of Information Technology on Financial Services Systems (Govt Printing
Office, Sept 1984) (OTA-CIT-202); Henry C. Lucas, Jr. & Robert A. Schwartz, eds, The Challenge of
Information Technology for the Securities Markets (Dow Jones-Irwin, 1989); Saunders & White, eds,
Technology and the Regulation of FinancialMarkets (cited in note 11); Siegel, ed, Innovation and Technology
in the Markets (cited in note 11).
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For example, no effort seems to have been made to quantify the actual
reduction of risk that T+3 could provide. 76
(2) Assumptions and Information About Retail Investors. The DRCS
proposal is based on several explicit and implicit assumptions about
retail investors, none of which appear to have been subjected to
77
sufficiently close scrutiny.
(3) Costs and Benefits of Creating and Operating a New System. Because
DRCS would be accessible to retail investors it would seem to follow
that it would be even more friendly to active wholesale market
participants. Presumably institutional investors would consider
taking advantage of daily registration on the books of issuers'
transfer agents. If this were so, then the system could not be viewed
as a limited one applicable only to risk-averse retail investors. It
would involve the creation and implementation of a fundamentally
changed market system. Moreover, by adding additional steps to
many transactions, the operating costs could be increased. Would
the costs outweigh the benefits? 78 Who would bear the
implementation costs and, if any, increased operational costs? It is
unlikely that these costs would be borne only by the retail investors
79
who (presumably) would otherwise flee the market.
76. See Madhavan, Mendelson & Peake, 3 J Intl Sec Mkts at I (cited in note 22) (describing a
model that "can be used to develop quantitative estimates of the impact of a change in the settlement
period").
77. The Direct Registration Subcommittee of the U.S. Working Committee did conduct an
"investor sentiment survey" of 362 randomly selected holders of physical certificates and directly
registered dividend reinvestment plan shareholders. G-30, Implementing the Group of Thirty
Recommendations at VI-9 to VI-18 (cited in note 46). Although that survey does provide some
insight into the preferences of these investors, it provides little or no insight as to some important
assumptions. For example:
(1) Retail investors who now choose to hold physical certificates would leave the market
if certificates were eliminated and investor choices were reduced to either (i) holding
through conventional securities accounts, or (ii) delivering paper instructions to their
broker before placing sell orders. The latter alternative might reduce the number of trades,
thereby costing brokers some commissions.
(2) Either (i) there would be a material, adverse effect on the market and its participants
arising out of the decisions of retail investors to flee the market, given those choices, or (ii)
it would not be feasible politically to limit investors to those choices.
(3) Retail investors who now hold certificates generally would be satisfied with, and use,
a system like DRCS.
None of these assumptions seems plausible, much less compelling. For example, a profile of the
prototype "paper holder" might reveal a natural person who does not own a PC, does not use ATMs,
and, perhaps, does not even believe in the radio! Would that investor be willing to sell securities by
using the telephone to get a magic number? Would that investor be satisfied if she were given the
option to continue holding paper securities, provided that she could not place a sell order for the
securities before making an actual delivery of the certificates to a broker?
78. The DRCS proposal addresses how to reach T+3 without disrupting retail investor
behavior patterns. It was not originally motivated by a general concern that intermediary risk, and
therefore intermediary control, must be reduced in any event.
79. Note that the T+3 proposal (and the other G-30 proposals) originated with the largest
players in the securities and banking industries. That is comforting in one sense; these players are
likely to be informed and, perhaps, not likely to make proposals that would adversely affect the
market. On the other hand, because costs might be passed on to other market participants in a way
that would not affect the competitive balance within and between the securities and banking
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Smaller, "lower tier" intermediaries who do not have direct relationships
with DTC might be disadvantaged by a DRCS system unless DRCS were to
make provision for automated direct registration of the interests of these
lower tier intermediaries' customers. That approach would necessitate
additional steps and complexity.
Would DRCS provide meaningful risk reduction? Arguably the principal
risks imposed by financial intermediary control of securities are those
involving default in the clearance and settlement process, not those regarding
fungible bulks already controlled for beneficial owner/customers.8 0 The
clearance and settlement risks would not be reduced by DRCS because
securities and payments would be "in the system" pending "street side"
settlement among intermediaries and "customer side" settlement consisting
of transfers or payments to customers. 8 '
(4) Additional Costs Resulting From the Reduction of Intermediary Control.
A system that would result in widespread and routine end-of-day
registration on issuers' books could impose costs other than the
direct costs of implementation and operation. For example:
(a) Reduced Monitoring. Those who select intermediaries to
control their securities generally have exercised care and
have been successful. Securities customer losses from
intermediary failure have been infrequent and generally not
large.8 2 If imposing a system like DRCS were to result in a
world where most securities customers are not exposed to
intermediary risk (except pending settlement), careful
selection and monitoring might be reduced. Although
small investors are protected by SIPC and private
insurance,8 3 investors with large accounts are not. Many
observers have noted the "moral hazard" problem imposed
by analogous deposit insurance for banks and have
attributed, at least in part, financial institution insolvencies
to that problem.8 4 If neither large nor small investors
engaged in monitoring (that is, if relatively little risk were
associated with the selection of an intermediary), arguably
intermediaries would engage in riskier behavior.
Nonetheless, it seems probable that the combination of
industries, there is no assurance that proposals from those industries inevitably will be efficient and
fair.
80. See text accompanying notes 20-21.
81. Keep in mind that the big players have managed intermediary risk well and the small players
are covered by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) and private insurance. See text
accompanying notes 26-30.
82. See note 28. During the last twenty years, the principal exceptions to the statement in the
text involved the failures during the mid-1980s of several then-unregulated government securities
dealers. See Mooney, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 328 n65 (cited in note 5).
83. See note 27.
84. See, for example, Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A
Summary of the Theoretical and EmpiricalArguments, 5 Yale J Reg 215, 223-39 (1988).
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regulation and supervision and monitoring by creditors who
are not securities customers would substantially offset any
reduced monitoring.
(b) Disparate Treatment. Imposition and widespread
selection of record ownership through DRCS (that is, if
DRCS were selected by a materially greater proportion of
securities claimants than the proportion who now hold
certificates) could result in highly disparate treatment of
securities claimants in the event of an intermediary
insolvency. Most of the securities claimants not in the
DRCS system might turn out to be those who had
transferred securities to an intermediary for sale or who had
already paid an intermediary for securities to be transferred
(that is, those whose transactions were pending settlement)
and those who had maintained ordinary securities accounts
primarily to maintain privacy (that is, those who do not wish
the issuer to know their identity). The intermediary's
insolvency would expose only those investors and not
others.
Inasmuch as more investors would be freed from risk and losses would be
smaller under an DRCS scheme, that scheme would provide the intended
benefits of reduced risk. But the distributional schemes in the Bankruptcy
Code and under SIPA contemplate that most customers will leave their
intermediary in control of securities.8 5 Were a much smaller proportion of
the investors exposed to intermediary risk, it might be necessary to rethink
distributional schemes designed in large part to operate in a market where
intermediary control is the norm.
(c) Increased Securities Borrowing. Current regulations allow
brokers to experience temporary shortfalls in customer
securities occasioned by failed trades (that is, someone fails
to deliver). 8 6 Were DRCS direct registration the norm, it
could result in increased securities borrowing by brokers in
order to meet street-side settlement obligations.8 7 That, in
turn, would result in additional credit risk for securities
85. See note 50.
86. See SEC Rule 15c3-3(b)(2), 17 CFR § 240.15c3-3(b)(2) (1988) ("temporary lags" in
obtaining possession or control of securities are permitted if they result from "normal business
operations" and the "broker or dealer takes timely steps in good faith to establish prompt physical
possession or control").
87. A securities borrowing transaction in this context might look something like this: Broker A
is short on X Company securities needed to satisfy its net settlement obligation. Broker A borrows
the X Company securities from Broker B and promises to "repay" the loan with a like quantity of X
Company securities on a day certain. Broker A gives to Broker B a quantity of Y Company securities
(normally of a slightly higher value than the borrowed X Company securities) as collateral for Broker
A's "repayment" obligation. Broker B earns a fee in the transaction. See David M. Weiss, After the
Trade is Made 364 (New York Inst Finance, 1986); see also Stigum, After the Trade at 204-05 (cited in
note 60) (describing securities borrowing in the government securities markets).
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lenders and additional expenses incurred by securities
borrowers.
(d) Countervailing Market Behavior. Although superficially
worrisome, all of these additional, indirect costs would
likely be overcome by market behavior. For example,
although less monitoring would occur, it probably would
occur at an appropriate level. Disparate treatment of
market participants would be based on ex ante choices made
by those participants, presumably made with their own
interests in mind. And securities would be borrowed only if
that activity were more efficient than the alternatives.
(5) Other Alternatives for Reducing Intermediary Risk. Comparing the
hypothetical world of DRCS with the existing system does not take
into account other, possibly more efficient and effective means of
reducing intermediary risk. The use of information technology for
enhanced regulation and supervision, discussed above, is an
example.
Existing technology could create and sustain something such as DRCS that
routinely would connect investors with issuers, thereby removing their
securities from fungible bulks controlled by intermediaries and reducing
intermediary risk. Reasonably accurate estimates of the direct costs of
implementing and operating the system probably could be made.
Nevertheless, it is enormously difficult to justify those costs. Predictions of
investor attitudes and behavior, the benefits of moving to T+3, and the
indirect costs that would be imposed by the system are problematic. The
proponents of the system do not seem to have addressed many important
implications or to have tested adequately their empirical assumptions. It is
not clear that the "problem" is a "problem," notwithstanding the appeal of
the proposed solution, and it not clear that the proposed solution is wise even
if the problem really exists. Other approaches, such as enhanced supervisory
techniques, may present better alternatives.
It is not the imposition of new applications of technology itself that is
controversial, but instead the allocations of risks and burdens that would arise
from or be displaced by changes in the systems. At least in the short run, the
market will not necessarily reach the most efficient result when entrenched
players are creating a single system to be employed by all intermediaries, with
the costs to be passed on to investors. The enchanting elegance of a new
system that seeks to solve a perceived problem can be misleading. At bottom,
the promise of automation cannot shelter decisionmakers from the persistent
empirical, behavioral, economic, and normative issues that must be faced in
resolving any issue of public policy.
In the longer run, the prospects seem good for continued reductions in
risk through the implementation of proposals such as DCRS. Competition for
investors and transactions between and among markets (New York, London,
and Tokyo, for example) should provide increasing incentives to move toward
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safer and more efficient front- and back-office systems. Satisfaction with
adequate, if not optimal, systems ("if it ain't broke, don't fix it") could result
in one market or another being left behind. Further, the Unpredictability
feature of information technology suggests that investments will be made on
the chance that improvements will result, even when the characteristics and
extent of the benefits remain uncertain.
D.

Choices Influenced by Technology: Federal/State Laws,
Statutes/Administrative Regulations, Statutory Drafting, and
International Harmonization

The attributes of information technology can influence choices about the
appropriate source and character of commercial law. For example, the
Frequent Change, System Complexity, and Technology Complexity attributes
suggest that administrative regulations, which can be amended with relative
ease, may be superior to statutes alone in dealing with information technology
driven markets.88 Similarly, when compared to state legislation, federal law
and regulations can offer enhanced uniformity and flexibility.8 9 Information
technology has been successfully employed in the process of designing
statutory language structures.9 0 Finally, the important role of information
technology in the evolution of truly global markets has made the need for
harmonization among various legal and regulatory regimes increasingly
important. 91
88. As David Goldstein has observed,
in a high technology area, existing conditions can be expected to change. Adoption and

widespread implementation of amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code to address
interpretational problems and changes in the industry could be glacially slow.... [T]his is a
process that takes years, rather than months, in an industry [banking] that may not be able
to live for years with a legislated problem.
This argues for governmental supervision through regulation. A regulatory scheme
would allow changes to be made far more easily and rapidly as conditions change and
inadequacies in the initial regulation are identified.
David B. Goldstein, Federal Versus State Adoption of Article 4A, 45 Bus L 1513, 1517-18 (1990) (footnote
omitted); see also Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State Law: Some

Lessons from the Payment System, 49 Ohio St LJ 1251, 1272 (1989) (an administrative regulatory regime
is superior to a legislative one in keeping operational rules up-to-date and in making and responding
to innovation).
89. Again according to Goldstein, "a scheme under state-by-state enactment could result in
nonuniform regulations from state to state, and thereby defeat the purpose of having a uniform
statute. On the other hand, regulation under a federal statute would clearly be practical." Goldstein,
45 Bus L at 1518 (cited in note 88) (footnotes omitted); see also Rubin, 49 Ohio St LJ at 1265-68
(cited in note 88). The "federalization" of commercial law is a widely debated, controversial, and
complex subject. See, for example, Robert Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code,

16 L & Contemp Probs 100 (1951); Barkley Clark, Secured Transactions, 42 Bus L 1333 (1987); Charles
W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Some Observations on the Past,
Present, and Futureof the UCC, 41 Bus L 1343 (1986); David M. Phillips, Secured Credit and Bankruptcy: A
Callfor the Federalization of PersonalProperty Security Law, 50 L & Contemp Probs 53 (1987); E. Hunter
Taylor, Jr., Foreword: Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 Rutgers Camden L J 527 (1980).
90. See, for example, Grayfred B. Gray, Reducing UnintendedAmbiguity in Statutes: An Introduction to
Normalization of Statutory Drafting, 54 Tenn L Rev 433 (1987).

91. See OTA, Trading Around the Clock at 3 (cited in note 1) ("One of the shared conclusions
of these studies [of international clearing and settlement] is that the world's major clearing and
settlement systems should be 'harmonized' in selected ways in order to strengthen them and prepare
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CONCLUSION

This article began by identifying several general attributes of information
technology. It hypothesized that this taxonomy could enlighten and benefit
those who create, administer, and interpret law. It next considered, in the
penumbra of these attributes, various specifics of securities transfer and
securities market clearance and settlement. Along the way, some general
observations were made about the interaction between the characteristics of
information technology and the creation, administration, and interpretation
of law. Other observations remain to be made explicit here.
The seemingly clear and consistent trends relating to information
technology are tempered by the technology's inherently countervailing
unpredictability. Opting for laws that are flexible and general instead of rigid
and specific may prove to be an important strategy for lawmakers. On the
other hand, there may be times when it is best to implement a specific "best
guess" at what kind of legal regime may be needed in the future. The revised
article 8's regime for uncertificated securities is a case in point. On a more
general level, we might aspire to laws that are paper-neutral and that take into
account all forms of communication--even forms that cannot be imagined.
The challenge is obvious. Perhaps "technology impact statements" should
accompany new laws and regulations, thereby encouraging lawmakers to
consider the effect of law on, and the effects on law of, information
technology.
Purging detail from laws that regulate such matters as property claims and
financial transactions does not alone provide an adequate response to the
information age. There will remain contexts where explicit detail and
guidance is desirable. The gap might be bridged by administrative
regulations that can be modified more easily and rapidly. Regulations on the
federal level could address matters traditionally governed by state statutory
law.
Information technology has been proven useful in the context of statutory
drafting. But the attributes of information technology call into question more
than the source, style, and structure of law. For example, information
technology provides an opportunity to rethink the substantive underpinnings
of the regulatory and supervisory approaches toward financial institutions that
were developed in the first half of this century. And as the social benefits of
information technology applications increase, they may incrementally
outweigh some of the perceived costs, such as the diminution of privacy.
for the emerging global trading environment."). Suppose an investor wishes to buy securities on
Wednesday morning in New York (Wednesday night in Tokyo) and re-sell the same securities on
Thursday morning in Tokyo (Wednesday night in New York). If Tokyo settlement were to occur on
T+3 and if New York settlement were to occur on T+5, the investor could not meet its settlement
obligation in Tokyo on T+3 (unless it incurred the cost of borrowing securities) because it would
not yet have received the securities in New York. This simple example illustrates the importance of
harmonization to efforts to link the world's markets.
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Some of the attributes of information technology are not unique to it. For
example, the foregoing discussion of costs and benefits of a DRCS-type
system illustrated that the questions of whether and how to apply information
technology in a given context pose the same kinds of difficulties that are
involved in resolving any issue of law reform or social policy. Similarly, the
Frequent Change and Unpredictability attributes also are apt descriptions of
the financial markets generally in recent years, where most of the significant
events were thought to have been impossible shortly before they occurred.
The following come to mind: a prime rate of 21 percent; the defacto failure of
Continental Bank brought on by purchasing participations in loans generated
by an Oklahoma City shopping center bank; a more than 500-point fall in the
Dow Jones Industrial Average in one day; a $24 billion leveraged buyout (RJR
Nabisco); allowing hundreds of insolvent S & Ls to continue operations;
Texaco's Chapter 11 filing brought on by a single tort judgment; and the
Failure of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, the high-flying securities firm darling of
the 1980s. As the realization emerges that the "impossible" is the "normal"
in the financial markets, perhaps the same realization will increasingly be seen
as applicable to information technology.
Notwithstanding the arrival of the information age, based on my anecdotal
observations and involvement in various "law reform" projects, my
impression is that for players in the legal theater, it is largely "business as
usual." Not surprisingly, close attention is paid to information technology in
the study of legal regulation of technology dominated relationships and
transactions, such as electronic data interchange, computerized public filing
systems, property attributes of information, electronic funds transfer, and
electronic letters of credit-topics treated or mentioned elsewhere in this
symposium issue. But I submit that more thought, dialogue, and energy
should be directed toward formulating a more generalized and principled
approach to taking account of information technology in the legal process.
And if it is to be influential and successful, a more generalized approach must
be useful, visible, and understandable to actors in the legal system who are
not "techies." 9 2 Perhaps the generalizations articulated in this article will assist
and inform that project.

92. The suffix -nik "convert[s] a verb, noun or adjective into a colorful pejorative for an ardent
lover, cultist or devotee of something ....
" Leo Rosten, Hoorayfor Yiddish 233 (Touchstone ed,
1984). -Nik implies an uncritical or poorly informed enthusiast, as contrasted to a maven, or expert.
Id at 207. Krier & Gillette, 84 Mich L Rev at 407 n7 (cited in note 74). I use the term "techie" to
include both techniks and technology mavens.

